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THE CHANGING BASIS OF AUTHORITY AND DISCIPLINE  
IN THE NAVY

By

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## PREFACE

The social and organization revolution which permeates contemporary society, has its counterpart in the United States Navy. It is the purpose of this paper to examine in some detail the changing basis of authority and discipline in the Navy which has been created by the change in the social philosophy of the larger society.

In seeking to investigate the changing basis of discipline and authority in the Navy, the author found it convenient to address himself to five general areas of interest.

First, it was apropos to spotlight the highpoints in the historical development of the gradual shift away from discipline and authority founded on authoritarianism in order to provide the reader with a basic grasp of the evolutionary nature of the problem.

Second, it was interesting and vital to the proper understanding of this trend to attempt to isolate and probe into the reasons underlying the new change of philosophy.

Third, it seemed significant to trace the development of the new code of military justice which formally reflected the acceptance of the new democratic concept of discipline and authority.

Next, in order to properly gauge the assimilation of this shift away from discipline based upon domination, it was necessary to investigate less formal means of implementation.

Finally, the dilemmas, problems and outlook for the future created by this changing philosophy are briefly examined.







The need for the proper understanding and appreciation of the shifting emphasis in authority is vital in order for each officer and petty officer to function effectively in today's Navy. Hopefully, this study will be of value in clarifying what has happened, why it has happened, and what is being done to integrate this new democratic philosophy of personnel management into the concepts of naval leadership.



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CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
CHANGE IN THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY  
AND DISCIPLINE IN THE  
UNITED STATES NAVY

THE

AMERICAN

REVIEW

OF

THE  
LITERATURE  
OF  
THE  
UNITED  
STATES

## CHAPTER I

### THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHANGE IN THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY AND DISCIPLINE IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY

The Code of Oleron, derived from the sea laws of the Republic of Rhodes, was adopted by Richard Coeur de Lion in Marseilles in the twelfth century while transporting his army by sea from southern France to the Holy Land. An examination of excerpts from this code is enlightening:

Anyone that should kill another on board ship should be tied to the dead body and thrown into the sea.

Anyone that should kill another on land should be tied to the dead body and buried with it in the earth.

Anyone lawfully convicted of drawing a knife or other weapon with intent to strike another, or of striking another so as to draw blood, should lose his hand.

Anyone lawfully convicted of theft should have his head shaved and boiling pitch poured upon it and feathers or down should be strewn upon it for the distinguishing of the offender; and upon the first occasion he should be put ashore.<sup>1</sup>

The Uniform Code of Military Justice, adopted for use by all of the armed services of the United States in 1951 offers an interesting contrast to the Code of Oleron. The following is quoted from Article 55 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice:

Punishment by flogging, branding, marking, tatooing on the body, or any cruel or unusual punishment shall not be adjudged by any court martial or inflicted upon any person subjected to this code.

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<sup>1</sup>Leland P. Lovette, Naval Customs Traditions and Usage (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Co., Inc., 1959), p. 69.





The use of irons, single or double, except for the purpose of safe custody, is strictly prohibited.<sup>2</sup>

The contrast offered by these two codes of naval law which spans 800 years of history focuses attention on the change in the concept of authority and discipline which has evolved over the centuries. It is the intent of this chapter to examine some of the highpoints in the historical evolution of naval discipline and authority which has led to the present day Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Richard Coeur de Lion brought the Code of Oleron back to England upon his return from the Crusades at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The general tenets of this ancient set of maritime laws governed the sea power of England for many years.<sup>3</sup> The Black Book of the British Admiralty which in large part adopted the principal precepts of the Code of Oleron appeared in the fifteenth century.<sup>4</sup> The duties of an admiral in the fifteenth century were all encompassing and were exercised in absolute authority. He was to administer justice "according to the law and the ancient customs of the sea".<sup>5</sup>

During the reign of Henry VIII (1509-1547) of England, the Orders for War, to be used both for land and sea, came into existence. These orders saw the beginning of a paradoxical period during which discipline remained severe, authority absolute, and great emphasis was given to the instigation of religious rites aboard ships of the British fleet. For example:

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<sup>2</sup>Manual for Courts-Martial United States 1951. p. 431.

<sup>3</sup>Lovette, p. 69.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.



On the fourth offense of a man sleeping on watch the following punishment was ordered:

Being taken asleep he shall be hanged to the bowsprit end of the ship in a basket with a can of beer, a loaf of bread, and a sharp knife, and choose to hang there until he starve or cut himself loose into the sea.

These orders also specified that the watch was to be set every night by eight of the clock either by trumpets or drum or singing the Lord's Prayer, some of the Psalms of David, or clearing the glass.<sup>6</sup>

The strong religious influence prevalent during the reign of Henry VIII continued to be felt throughout the Elizabethan and post Elizabethan periods but abated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The first statutes containing the courts martial are found in the British Mutiny Act of 1689. By this act the ruler of England could authorize any officer not under the rank of a field officer authorization for holding a general court-martial.<sup>7</sup> Although almost three hundred years have transpired since this legislation was enacted, it is still the source of the military law of the English speaking people.

Naval law in England originally was loosely administered. The Lord High Admiral issued policy statements and general instructions, and the naval commanders administered the law at their discretion. The authority of the commanders was absolute and sentences were often excessive. Death sentences were given at the discretion of the commanders, even in peacetime.

The first Articles of War for the Royal Navy were approved about 1661. The articles were an amalgamation of pertinent instructions that had been promulgated by admirals in command. In 1749 a new set of Articles of War were approved by the Parliament. These articles improved upon the Articles

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 70.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 71.





of 1661 by specifying offenses and punishments in much more detail. Many death penalties were incorporated into these regulations which undoubtedly accounts for the numerous death penalties in the old Articles for the Government of the Navy of the United States.<sup>8</sup>

The first articles of naval law for the American navy were drawn up by John Adams who, although not a mariner, was a lawyer with a keen interest in maritime law and was familiar with the admiralty law of England.<sup>9</sup> These articles were entitled the Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies and were approved by the Continental Congress in 1775. Constituting about forty paragraphs and being very fragmentary, these articles generally defined the rights and duties of the officers, and certain punishments for infractions of discipline were delineated. It is interesting to note some excerpts from these articles. The third article read:

If any shall be heard to swear, curse or blaspheme the name of God, the Commander is strictly enjoined to punish them by causing them to wear a wooden collar or some shameful bag, for so long a time as he shall judge proper.<sup>10</sup>

The fourth article read:

No commander shall inflict any punishment upon a seaman beyond twelve lashes upon his bare back with a cat-o-nine-tails; if the fault shall deserve a greater punishment, he is to apply to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in order to the trying of him by a Court Martial, and in the meantime he may put him under confinement.<sup>11</sup>

Although the articles of 1775 showed some amelioration in the elimination of inhumane practices, the authority of the Commanding Officer remained completely absolute. John Paul Jones made the following statement

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>9</sup>William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 22.

<sup>10</sup>Lovette, p. 73.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.





A navy is essentially and necessarily aristocratic. True as may be the political principles for which we are now contending they can never be practically applied or even admitted on board ship, out of port or off soundings. This may seem a hardship, but it is nevertheless the simplest of truths. Whilst the ships sent forth by the Congress may and must fight for the principles of human rights and republican freedom the ships themselves must be ruled and commanded at sea under a system of absolute despotism.<sup>12</sup>

The small but effective Continental Navy fought and lived under the articles of 1775. These articles were used until the adoption of the Constitution in 1787 created the United States of America. The Constitution, by Article I, Section 8, endowed the new Congress of the United States with power:

"To provide and maintain a Navy"

"To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces"

After the Revolutionary War the Continental Navy was abolished, and a new navy did not appear until the frigates UNITED STATES, CONSTITUTION, and CONSTELLATION were commissioned in 1797 to protect our shipping in the Mediterranean against the Barbary pirates. With ships in commission, Congress in 1797 adopted the articles of 1775, modified to meet the exigencies of changing times and conditions. ~~These regulations~~ were entitled, Articles for the Government of the Navy of the United States and existed under this title until superceded in 1951 by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.<sup>13</sup> Like the articles of 1775, the new regulations drew their authority from the Constitution, were severe and conferred absolute authority upon the

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<sup>12</sup>Naval Leadership (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1939), p. xvi.

<sup>13</sup>Organization and Functions of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 2.



commanding officer of a naval vessel. Flogging was authorized for profane swearing or drunkenness.<sup>14</sup>

From the adoption of the Articles for the Government of the Navy in 1797 to their demise in 1951, there is a gradual shift away from the authoritarian discipline and absolutism of authority that characterized the British, Colonial, and American navies of the eighteenth century. In late November 1842 aboard the U.S. brig SOMERS enroute from Liberia to New York, Midshipman Phillip Spencer, son of the Secretary of War, and two seamen were hanged at the yardarm for attempting to incite a mutiny. This death sentence was carried out after a proper trial under the Articles for the Government of the Navy. Upon docking in New York Commander Alexander Mackenzie, U.S.N., Commanding Officer of SOMERS, was charged with murder through political efforts of the Secretary of War. Commander Mackenzie was honorably acquitted after a long trial.<sup>15</sup> The controversy and publicity of this trial in effect brought to an end the summary execution of convicted naval personnel at sea. The execution of Midshipman Spencer was the last of its kind to be recorded in the annals of the U.S. Navy.

About this same time, Captain Uriah P. Levy, a Jewish chaplain in the U.S. Navy, began his efforts to have flogging abolished in the U.S. Navy. As indicated earlier, flogging had been authorized in the original Articles for the Government of the Navy. In 1800 the total number of lashes was limited to 100 and not more than twelve were to be applied at any one time.<sup>16</sup> The Naval Appropriations Act of August 3, 1848 directed the Secretary of the Navy to report to Congress the number of persons

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<sup>14</sup>"Flogging In The Navy," JAG Journal, October, 1951, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup>Lovette, p. 246.

<sup>16</sup>JAG Journal, October, 1951, p. 10.





flogged in the navy in 1846 and 1847. This act was a direct result of the public clamor against flogging which developed mostly through the efforts of Chaplain Levy. The following are excerpts from some of the reports received in response to the Naval Appropriations Act of 1848:

Cursing the Corporal -----	8 lashes
Being Lousey -----	6 lashes with the cat
Stealing wig from Major Ringold -----	12 lashes with the cat <sup>17</sup>

In 1850 Senator John Hale (New Hampshire) added an anti-flogging clause to the Naval Appropriations Bill. In 1851-53, Commodore R. F. Stockton, Senator from California, further restricted flogging by legislation, and on July 17, 1862 Congress abolished flogging completely.<sup>18</sup>

This gradual erosion of absolutism and unchecked authority continued throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century. Almost imperceptibly the basis of authority and discipline became less authoritarian, and more thought and effort were devoted to preserving the dignity and protecting the feelings of the enlisted man in the United States Navy. In 1922 the United States Naval Academy initiated a formal course in leadership. The following is taken from the textbook used in this pioneer course in leadership:

There are various ways of securing discipline. There is the discipline based upon the fear of the consequences of its violation - the discipline of fear. There is what we like to consider as the American ideal of discipline - a cheerful and spontaneous discipline to which men willingly and galdly subject themselves out of the faith in the cause for which they are striving and out of respect for the complete confidence in their leaders.

Discipline of fear alone will not work well with American personnel. The average American boy of eighteen or twenty that chooses

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<sup>17</sup>"Interesting Facts About Flogging," JAG Journal, September 1951, p. 23.

<sup>18</sup>Lovette, p. 207.



the Navy for a career has been reared in an atmosphere of intellectual and personal freedom, has been reasonably well educated, and has become habituated to forming his own opinions of affairs in general. His actions on the whole have been regulated chiefly by his ambition and the contents of his pocketbook. No doubt the great majority have a firm faith in the American ideal of survival of the fittest and eventual triumph of merit.

Officers must realize that in their relations with the blue-jackets of today they are dealing with intelligent and ambitious men who, as a rule, are anxious to make good.<sup>19</sup>

The inductions of millions of civilians into the armed forces during World War II brought about changes in the military system of authority and discipline. This massive buildup of personnel brought to the surface the discontent and dissatisfaction that was being felt in the armed services. In response to these pressures, Secretary of War Patterson in late 1945 ordered a board convened headed by Lieutenant General Hanes H. Doolittle to investigate the officer-enlisted man relationship in the Army. The board met during the Spring of 1946 and concerned itself primarily with an examination of the complaints and comments on the lack of democracy in the Army, instances of incompetent leadership, and abuses of privileges. The Doolittle Board delivered its final report to the Secretary of War on 20 May 1946. One of the most important conclusions was, "There is a need for a new philosophy in military order, a policy of treatment of men, especially in the ranks in terms of advanced concepts in social thinking. The present system does not permit full recognition of the dignity of man. More definite protection from the arbitrary acts of supervisors is essential."<sup>20</sup> The effects of the recommendations and conclusions were far reaching and were felt in the Navy as well as the Army. The Doolittle Board triggered off the

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<sup>19</sup>Naval Leadership, p. 36.

<sup>20</sup>"Board Asks for More Pay, Liberal Retirements", Army-Navy Journal, June 1, 1946, p. 1160.





activity which eventually led to the adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1951. Far sighted and enlightened officers in the Navy also recognized the need for a new social philosophy on authority and discipline. The following has been taken from an address by Admiral R. B. CARNEY, USN (Ret) to students of the Naval War College:

World War II brought about some drastic changes in concept with respect to command qualifications and the exercise of command. The rapidly expanding services brought an influx of patriotic citizens rallying to the flag, civilians at heart, unaccustomed to the regimentation of military life. Here, again, the importance of leadership as opposed to the stark command was obvious. --- Captain Bligh relied upon seamanship, aloofness, nerve, and the cat of nine tails. --- Today as things have evolved in our services, Commanders no longer have unquestioned Olympian life-and-death authority, and leadership is needed to inspire the sort of loyalty and confidence which can compel intelligent men obediently to follow. The Uniform Code of Military Justice by its restrictions on authority of the individual, imposes an obligation for leading by precept and intelligence not laid down even as recently as World War II.<sup>21</sup>

The adoption of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1951 was a giant step away from discipline founded on authoritarianism. The new code reflected the intentions of Congress to provide:

1. Additional safeguards against the exercise of undue control by convening authorities.
2. That enlisted men for the first time could sit as members of court martials of other enlisted men.
3. That an enlisted man for the first time could appeal to the next higher authority the punishment awarded by his commanding officer.
4. That confinement on bread and water except on board ships at sea be abolished.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>R. B. Carney, "Evolutionary Aspects of Command", Naval War College Review, September, 1963, p. 3.

<sup>22</sup>"The Uniform Code of Military Justice", JAG Journal, July, 1950, p. 9.





It is easily discernible that the authority of the commanding officer was considerably reduced when the Uniform Code of Military Justice was adopted.

This reduction in authoritarianism has continued after World War II and is discernible from a number of vantage points. The "beast barrack" and "shock treatment" concepts are being replaced at recruit training centers by a more humane and signified assimilation philosophy that is oriented toward the team concept of warfare.

The gradual closing of the uniform and privilege gap between the officers and enlisted men is indicative of the shift in the basis of authority from status toward morale.<sup>23</sup> At present, the Navy is seriously considering eliminating one of the most obvious authoritarian status symbols, the time honored Jumper, Bell Bottom Trouser, and Sailor Cap; a new enlisted man's uniform similar to that worn by officers is currently being worn and evaluated aboard designated stations and ships in the fleet.

Ceremonialism, another manifestation of the authoritarian attitude, was dealt a blow during World War II from which it has never recovered. Great numbers of ceremonial practices and all types of dress uniforms were discarded during the war. Attempts were made to restore "things to normal" after the war, but they were never completely successful.

The evolution of the new social philosophy in the Navy was reflected in the late fifties when a change in fitness report forms made it mandatory to comment on whether the officer being evaluated achieved his goals with little or no regard for the dignity and feelings for the people who worked for him.

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<sup>23</sup>Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1959), p. 15.



In 1963 the Secretary of the Navy in response to a change in concept from "confinement" of enlisted personnel to a new more enlightened philosophy of "correctional custody" issued instructions which demonstrate the new social philosophy of authority and discipline. The following statements apply to enlisted personnel undergoing "correctional custody":

Each offender will be assigned a counselor, on a collateral duty basis, who should be a mature member of the command. The assigned counselor should interview the man, observe and keep an informal record of his progress, and make recommendations to the commanding officer with regard to his eventual disposition. The counselor will when appropriate, refer the man to other members of the command if their specialized assistance is needed in correcting the causes of the offenses.<sup>24</sup>

Before moving on to the next chapter to try to determine why this change in discipline and authority has taken place, it is considered appropriate to conclude this chapter with the following statement of Dr. Janowitz:

"There has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment, a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus. The organization revolution which pervades contemporary society, and which implies management by means of persuasion, explanation, and expertise is also to be found in the military."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup>Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 3.





CHAPTER II

UNDERLYING CAUSES BEHIND THE SHIFT  
IN THE BASIS OF  
AUTHORITY



## CHAPTER II

### UNDERLYING CAUSES BEHIND THE SHIFT IN THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY

In the previous chapter an attempt was made to show that the very basis of authority and discipline has undergone a metamorphosis which is still in the evolutionary stage. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to isolate and examine some of the major causes for this evolution of authority and discipline philosophy.

The evolving shift in the philosophy of authority and discipline in the United States Navy has paralleled the organization and social revolution which the civilized world has experienced. The civilized community has made great progress in bridging the gap between the old world view where individuals are cells in a greater organism, naturally dependent, obedient, and controlled by strong authority, and the new world where every human being is naturally self-controlling and the best conditions are those which interfere the least with the individual's exercise of natural freedoms.<sup>1</sup> One hundred fifty years ago, Americans recognized that all men are free and organized our democratic system in a fashion to restrict the government. Consequently, as men became more enlightened, more civilized and less brutal in their relations with each other, the discipline and authority of the naval service became more humanitarian and less authoritarian.

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<sup>1</sup>Rose Wilder Lane, The Discovery of Freedom (New York: The John Day Co., 1943), p. 208.



The industrial revolution in the latter part of the nineteenth century accentuated man's attempts to throw off the chains of mechanistic authority. During the 1930's studies by behavioral scientists of the conditions under which factory workers labored had a profound and lasting effect on the treatment of the enlisted personnel of the U.S. Navy.

The emergence of the labor unions and collective bargaining was another step forward in the elimination of authoritarianism. Men could no longer be treated under the outdated concept of total authority. Man was evolving toward a state of truly being free. The social and cultural revolution left its imprint on the U.S. Navy. Although lagging in the changes which pervaded contemporary society, nevertheless the Navy slowly changed its attitude toward total authority and domination.

The youths of today are reared in a democratic and prosperous environment, are intelligent and well educated, and are an altogether different group from the youths that were inducted into the Navy 50 years ago. In 1965 98.1% of the enlisted personnel in the Navy had graduated from grade school, 54.5% had graduated from high school and 5.9% had completed some college.<sup>2</sup> The youth of today due to his environment and intelligence cannot be effectively led through the use of authoritarian methods. In a test conducted several years ago using Naval aviation cadets, an attempt was made to determine if the more authoritarian cadets would be chosen as military leaders by their potential followers. The results clearly indicated the authoritarian personality is less likely to be chosen as leader. The conclusions indicated that authoritarians are individuals who are unable to deal effectively with the needs of others and therefore tend to

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<sup>2</sup>Wayne Hawkins (ed), Uniformed Services Almanac, (Washington: Moore and Moore, Inc., 1965), p. 155.





be rejected as leaders by potential followers. This might be indicative of a lack of social intelligence by authoritarians.<sup>3</sup> That the modern sailor bears little resemblance to his former counterpart is described as follows in the The Naval Officers Guide:

Who are the American bluejackets? First of all, the vast majority of American bluejackets, the non-rated seamen, are better educated and more intelligent than in former years. They have been taught to use their mind constructively and when properly trained, they can trouble shoot and repair complicated equipment aboard ship which would baffle many college trained engineers. On the other hand, many of them are more demanding of their rights and insist on "democratic treatment" - some of the less well adjusted even deny the necessity of military authority as a concept . . .

Many non-rated men are in the Navy "just for the ride" to perform their required service and no more . . . Though their greater intelligence make them easier to instruct and train they are harder to handle. The challenge to the junior officer is with him every moment of his working day. He must employ all the tools of good leadership and develop to the maximum his skill in human relations . . .

They are representative young Americans who are willing (but not eager) to do their bit, are ready to follow direction and accept necessary privations but will resist autocratic regimentation with democratic fervor. They are too intelligent to follow blindly wherever they are led, too imbued with a sense of rightness to be driven . . .

Military discipline and autocratic authority of a military society are foreign to our democratic youths.<sup>4</sup>

In addition to altering the rules of authority and employing more effective leadership techniques in order to accomodate the changing man due to the social and the organization revolution, other factors have played a major role in the evolution of authority and discipline in the Navy. The complex war machines of 1965 make it mandatory to achieve genuine cooperation in team evolutions in order to achieve our military objectives. The authoritarian variety of discipline and leadership does

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<sup>3</sup>E. P. Hollander, "Authoritarianism and Leadership in a Military Setting", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, July, 1954, p. 369.

<sup>4</sup>Arthur A. Ageton and William P. Mack, The Naval Officers Guide, (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1960), p. 173.





not achieve the same degree of cooperation as does a more democratic variety. This statement had credence lent to it by a test given to 114 freshman psychology students at the University of North Carolina. After being divided into twelve authoritarian groups and twelve democratic groups, the students were tested in problem solving that required genuine group cooperation. The results clearly indicated that the authoritarian groups made more errors than did the democratic groups.<sup>5</sup> Max Moser, a German psychologist said:

The main problems of modern military leadership are focused in the cohesion of groups and cohesion of tactical action. The principle of subordination is no longer sufficient and is ineffective because leadership is decentralized through necessity and coercion of a situation. Therefore it must be replaced by the principle of integration which creates:

- (1) rank order among members of a group and
- (2) aims at the realization of three goals
  - (a) human integration into a fighting community
  - (b) insight into the coherence of military situations and intentions.
- (3) every soldier, especially the lower and lowest leaders must be enabled to make meaningful and considerate decisions on his own by taking into account situations, goals, and neighboring fighting units.<sup>6</sup>

The technology of warfare is so complex that the coordination of a complex group of specialists cannot be guaranteed by authoritarian discipline. Table 2-1 depicts the growing percentage of naval enlisted personnel who are moving into the technical and scientific areas of occupational groupings within the Navy. Members of a military group recognize their greater mutual dependence on the technical proficiency rather than on a formal authority structure.<sup>7</sup> The high speed nuclear attack submarine and the

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<sup>5</sup>Herbert W. Eber, "Problem Solving by Small Groups Under Varying Conditions of Personality and Organization", The American Psychologist, July, 1952, p. 268.

<sup>6</sup>Max Moser, "Neue Probleme Der Militarischen Fñhrung", Soziale Welt, 1953, p. 326.

<sup>7</sup>Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 41

The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the existence of a solution of the system of equations (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . It is shown that the system has a solution for arbitrary values of the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  if and only if the matrix  $A$  is nonsingular. The second part of the paper is devoted to a detailed study of the properties of the solution of the system (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . It is shown that the solution of the system (1) is unique and depends continuously on the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ .

The third part of the paper is devoted to a study of the properties of the solution of the system (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . It is shown that the solution of the system (1) is unique and depends continuously on the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . The fourth part of the paper is devoted to a study of the properties of the solution of the system (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . It is shown that the solution of the system (1) is unique and depends continuously on the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ .

The fifth part of the paper is devoted to a study of the properties of the solution of the system (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . It is shown that the solution of the system (1) is unique and depends continuously on the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . The sixth part of the paper is devoted to a study of the properties of the solution of the system (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . It is shown that the solution of the system (1) is unique and depends continuously on the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ .

The seventh part of the paper is devoted to a study of the properties of the solution of the system (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . It is shown that the solution of the system (1) is unique and depends continuously on the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . The eighth part of the paper is devoted to a study of the properties of the solution of the system (1) for arbitrary values of the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ . It is shown that the solution of the system (1) is unique and depends continuously on the parameters  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$ .

carrier based supersonic all weather jet interceptor are two examples of war machines where precision and team work is a prerequisite for survival and success.

As an adjunct to teamwork, the successful sailor of today must possess a high degree of initiative. Although there have been great changes in the military system, the organization prototype and the real character of the naval organization is found in the combat unit. During actual combat the maintenance of initiative is much more important than the rigid enforcement of discipline.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment, 35



TABLE 1  
OCCUPATIONAL GROUPING OF UNITED STATES NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL<sup>a</sup>

Item	Civil War	Spanish - Amer. War	World War I	World War II	Korean War
Personnel-Number	84,415	22,875	599,051	4,183,466	1,177,000
Enlisted Personnel Occupational Grouping %	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Technical & Scientific	.15	.53	3.66	10.4	12.7
Administrative & Clerical	.73	3.13	7.99	12.6	18.1
Mechanics & Repairmen	.10	.95	8.49	16.6	15.3
Craftsmen	.50	.14	13.03	55.9	4.7
Service Workers	2.41	6.49	12.52	9.6	12.4
Operators & Laborers	2.91	2.18	20.20	6.1	6.5
Military Type Occupations Not Elsewhere Classified	93.20	86.59	34.11	38.80	30.3

<sup>a</sup>Taken from: Statistical Abstract of United States: 1964 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), Enlisted Personnel Occupational Grouping, p. 263.





This emphasis on initiative has been recognized for some time. During World War II the Japanese trained their soldiers in Formosa to act self-reliantly and independently, and Hitler's system taught the individual German private to be self-controlling, self-reliant, and responsible.<sup>9</sup> General S. L. A. Marshall stated: "The philosophy of discipline has adjusted to the changing conditions. As more and more impact has gone into the hitting power of weapons, necessitating ever widening deployments in the forces of battle, the quality of initiative has become the most praised of the military virtues."<sup>10</sup>

With the advent of the atomic and space age, the military has become more civilianized and consequently less authoritative and domineering in the concept of discipline and authority. The complexity of the machinery of war and the requirements of research, development and technical maintenance tend to weaken the operational boundary between the military and the non-military since the maintenance of new weapons requires a greater reliance on civilian oriented technicians. Of all the services the Navy has felt this civilianizing effect the least because the very nature of shipboard life creates an entity which is normally beyond the sphere of civilian influence. However, as the ships are fitted out with more complicated equipment, civilian technicians go to sea with the ships to assist the crew in ironing out the "bugs" in systems. This relationship spans the gap between the military and civilian worlds and contributes toward the civilianization of the Navy.

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<sup>9</sup>Lane, 240.

<sup>10</sup>S. L. A. Marshall, Men Against Fire (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1947), p. 22.



Prior to World War II when the Navy was small, the naval community was almost self-contained. The entire population of an activity usually lived on the base in public quarters, shopped on the base at the Navy Exchanges and bought the food supplies at the base commissary. Entertainment was provided by the base movies and the enlisted men's and officer's clubs. Thus the entire population was capsulized within Navy activities and had little or no social or business intercourse with the civilian members of the community. With the rapid expansion of personnel during World War II and the subsequently large military force required to meet the Cold War commitments after the war, this cocoon type of existence has largely disappeared except at overseas bases. This has lead to a broadening of ideas by the military community and this civilianization has added to the steady erosion of the authoritative concept of discipline.

Another big obstacle between the military and civilian populace was the rapid expansion and equally rapid dismantlement of the naval establishment during and after periods of world wide conflicts. This cyclic nature of the size of the naval establishment in the past had instilled the feeling that the American public deserted the military after the war was over. Rudyard Kipling in his poem "Tommy" expressed the feeling perfectly when he wrote:

O it's Tommy this, an 'Tommy that, an'

'Tommy, go away';

But it's 'Thank you, Mister Atkins, ' when

the band begins to play"<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Rudyard Kipling, Departmental Ditties and Ballads and Barrack Room Ballads (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1912), p. 146.







However, since the late forties and the beginning of the Cold War, the size of the United States Navy has remained relatively stable. See Table 2 for a summary of the number of personnel on active duty in the Navy for the past fifteen years. This new stability has removed much of the bitterness from the civilian-military conflict and has contributed to a closer relationship between the Navy and the civilian populace.<sup>12</sup>

Prior to the explosion of the first Russian atomic bomb and the flight of the first Russian missile, the average American felt relatively safe from the mass destruction of war. It has been almost a hundred years since this country had to endure the ravages of war in our own land. Death and destruction by war was an experience that most of our population had never experienced. Today a totally different situation faces the inhabitants of this land. In event of a nuclear exchange with Russia, the civilian faces the same if not greater risks than do the military. The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles with 50 megaton hydrogen bomb warheads has socialized the risks of war for civilians and military alike.<sup>13</sup> This merging of risks has brought the military closer to the civilian world and added to the factors that are diluting the old philosophy of authoritarian leadership.

The last twenty years have witnessed the rise of the United States to a position of world leadership, and today this country has the heaviest load of international responsibilities in history.

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<sup>12</sup>Janowitz, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, 16.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*



TABLE 2

NAVAL PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY: 1940 TO 1965<sup>a</sup>

Year	Officers	Enlisted Men
1940	13,604	147,393
1941	29,092	255,335
1942	69,564	571,006
1943	179,676	1,562,074
1944	276,153	2,705,212
1945	331,379	3,049,438
1946	141,161	842,237
1950	44,641	336,897
1955	74,527	586,168
1958	71,560	569,445
1959	69,795	556,545
1960	69,559	548,425
1961	69,981	557,108
1962	75,302	591,126
1963	75,549	589,098
1964	76,446	593,546
1965	77,348	600,548

<sup>a</sup>Taken from: Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1964  
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office), Military Personnel  
on Active Duty, p. 261.





Military leaders today find themselves embroiled in complicated military/politico situations which require broad ranges of political, social, and economic policies. This has resulted in the military leaders entering into arenas that in the past have been reserved for civilian and professional politicians. This civilianization has given the leaders many non-military jobs which involve general management skills. At the top echelons this has caused a shift in emphasis gradually away from the hero concept to the manager concept. This emphasis of the traditional warrior concept has added impetus to the demise of the authoritarian philosophy of discipline and authority. The recent retirement of Air Force General Curtis Lemay produced the following comments in Time magazine:

Without a debate or dissenting vote, the Senate last week confirmed General J. P. McConnell, 57, as Air Force Chief of Staff and as the newest member of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The event was widely unheralded. Yet it marked the end of an era in the U. S. Military leadership. For McConnell succeeds none other than Curtis Lemay, last of the great combat commanders to serve on the Joint Chiefs . . .

The new Joint Chiefs seem ideally suited to the requirements of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, who personally selected each. No Defense Secretary in history has ever asserted Pentagon control like McNamara. For his top military advisors, he wants planners and thinkers, not heroes. He wants team men, not gladiators.<sup>14</sup>

Generally speaking, up to and including World War II, the military leaders, both Army and Navy, were allowed to run their own kind of war. Of course, overall planning of global strategy and coordination was required and was conducted at the highest military and civilian levels. However, the dismissal of General MacArthur by President Harry S. Truman over disagreement on how to prosecute the Korean War in 1951 was a forewarning of the mounting pressure for increased civilian control of what

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<sup>14</sup>"The Management Team", Time Magazine, February 5, 1965, p. 22.





had been before purely military matters. The Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1958 was a milestone in strengthening the office of the Secretary of Defense and handing over the reins of military power to the civilian heads of the defense establishment. Secretary Robert S. McNamara since his appointment by President John F. Kennedy in 1960 has increasingly exercised the authority made possible by the Act of 1958. The vast improvement in communications and the invention of the electronic data computer has allowed Secretary McNamara to extend his authority into operational matters and centralize the conduct of significant military operations. The new concept of Command and Control expresses the new philosophy of centralized civilian control. "A Command and Control System is a system that connects a commander to many sensor, support, and effector elements in order to have all these work together in a unified, integrated, and controlled manner toward some otherwise unattainable goal."<sup>15</sup> The urgent need for a national command and control system to enable the top civilian and military leaders to effectively exercise centralized operational control over significant military/politico situations was illustrated during the Cuban Crisis of October/November 1962. In the Fall of 1962, prior to the Cuban Crisis, the Secretary of Defense issued a directive that established the concepts of the National Military Command System. General Paul Tibbets, who has worked very closely with the development of this system said the National Military Command System was envisioned as having the capability to:

Provide National Command Authority (the President, Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) with the exact control of our military might that is required to protect the interests

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<sup>15</sup>Edward Bennet, James Degan, and Joseph Spiegel, (ed), Military Information Systems (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), p. v.





of the United States in the complex environment of a military political crisis situation less than a nuclear exchange.<sup>16</sup>

The Cuban Crisis confirmed the need for such a system and the program was accelerated. In February 1963, the Secretary of Defense confirmed establishment of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) in the Pentagon, organized rules for interactions between all governmental agencies and directed that significant politico/military matters be referred to the NMCC for top level decisions.<sup>17</sup> This system with its nerve center, NMCC, located at the Pentagon, encompassed the complete military spectrum, the White House, and the State Department. It is this type of philosophy that is surely and steadily handing over control of the military to the civilians. The extent to which the civilization has progressed can be illustrated by quoting part of an editorial in the Washington Evening Star:

When a bridge is to be bombed by American pilots in Laos, it is Defense Secretary McNamara who decides how many planes will fly the mission, not the Air Force.

When retaliatory raids are made in North Viet Nam, it is McNamara, the President and other civilian officials who pick the targets, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

When a coast must be blockaded-Cuba to be specific-it is McNamara, and the civilians who decode which ships shall be boarded and how and by whom, not the admiral running the blockade.

When the reconnaissance flights started over Laos, the Navy was told in detail by McNamara and his advisers just how to fly them.

In other words, a military operation is controlled in its smallest detail by civilians, not military men.<sup>18</sup>

This civilianization of even the operational matters is not conducive to the creation of an environment for total and absolute authority by

<sup>16</sup>Paul W. Tibbets, "About Our Working Military Command System", Armed Forces Management, July, 1964, p. 26.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>18</sup>Richard Fryklund, "Civilian Reins on Military Tighten," The Evening Star (Washington), February 18, 1965, p. A-18.





military leaders at any level. In fact to make such a complex and all encompassing centralized system work, requires the utmost in cooperation and coordination between all three services at even the lowest level of authority.

In the investigation of why the basis of authority and discipline in the Navy is moving toward a more democratic and social philosophy, it has been shown that the social and organization revolution evolving in the Navy is paralleling a similar revolution which is pervading society today. It has been demonstrated that since 1945, this movement has gained great impetus, due in large part of the lessons learned from World War II. It has become apparent that as long as the armed forces must rely largely on drafted personnel, or short term reservists who have volunteered because of the pressures of the selective service system, the military must accommodate itself to personnel who are essentially civilians. This constant flow of civilians in and out of the ranks of the military is a powerful influence against military traditionalism and authoritarianism.<sup>19</sup> Prior to World War II, the requirements of warfare and type of individuals needed to man the naval establishment were vastly different from those of today. Before going on to the next chapter to see how the Navy has reacted to this new evolving social philosophy, it is considered fitting to summarize this chapter with a statement by Admiral Carney:

New planning, new weapons, new techniques, and new technology has changed the business of command. The post war years, have perhaps, produced even more radical changes; unification; alliances; racing technology; weapons of undreamed of lethality; and an ever-increasing trend toward centralization . . . It is equally

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<sup>19</sup>Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 32.



apparent that the attributes of leadership, as opposed to raw authority have assumed ever-increasing importance in military life.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Carney, 8.



CHAPTER III

DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW CODE  
OF  
MILITARY JUSTICE





### CHAPTER III

#### DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

The founders of this great nation included within the Constitution explicit restraints upon the military. For example, the Constitution forbids the appropriation of funds for the Army for more than two years at a time. However, "it is a striking paradox that the political philosophers of the eighteenth century America dreaded a standing Army but complacently accepted a standing navy . . . They saw no incompatibility between the Navy and a free political system."<sup>1</sup> The general philosophy in the early days of this country's history was that there was little to fear from the Navy, and consequently the Navy was left alone to conduct its affairs as it saw fit. This laissez-faire attitude persisted for a number of years. Except for the notoriety stirred up by Chaplain Levy over the punishment by flogging in the middle of the nineteenth century and the public interest in the trial of Commander MacKenzie in 1842 for the hanging of Midshipman Spencer, the Navy was generally left to its own devices to determine the current philosophy on authority and discipline. Nevertheless over the years some progress was made in humanizing the mechanistic approach to discipline.

However, during World War II, the size of the Navy increased thirty fold, and the influx of civilians quickly pinpointed many problems in regard to discipline and authority that the Navy had to come to grips with.

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<sup>1</sup>William B. Pendergast, "The Navy and Civil Liberty", United States Naval Institute Proceedings, p. 1263.

## THE STATE

### THE STATE OF NEW YORK

IN SENATE,  
January 1, 1901.

REPORT  
OF THE  
COMMISSIONER OF THE LAND OFFICE,  
IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION  
PASSED BY THE SENATE,  
MAY 1, 1899.

ALBANY:  
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & COMPANY,  
PRINTERS,  
1899.

ALBANY: J. B. LIPPINCOTT & COMPANY, PRINTERS, 1899.

The problems uncovered in the Army during World War II were in fact more pronounced and more serious than those in the Navy. The Secretary of War convened the Doolittle Board in 1946 to look into these problems in the Army. The Doolittle Board interviewed 42 witnesses and received more than 1,000 letters from interested persons. Some of the major conclusions and recommendations of this board are listed below. See Appendix I for a complete list of conclusions and recommendations of the Doolittle Report.

#### Conclusions.

1. Americans look with disfavor upon any system which grants unearned privileges to a particular class of individuals and find distasteful any tendency to make arbitrary social distinctions between two parts of the Army.
2. There is a need for a new philosophy in the military order, a policy of treatment of men, especially in the ranks, in terms of advanced concepts of social thinking. The present system does not permit full recognition of the dignity of man.
3. One of the most lacking yet important phases of the military structure is an alert and effective internal policing service and an agency providing a practical means of redress.

#### Recommendations.

1. That steps be taken to improve leadership in the officer corps of the Army in order that the corps will merit the respect of the soldiers and civilians alike. The following specific actions be inaugurated.

a. That sufficient time be expended during orientation and indoctrination to inculcate thoroughly:

(1) A sound appreciation of responsibilities, and especially to subordinates.

(2) The intelligent use of authority.

(3) The idea that privileges which accompany rank and responsibility are established to better enable the individual to perform his duties effectively and efficiently and are not for the purpose of improving his own personal interest.

b. That in addition to the training in the technical subjects, each candidate, whether at West Point, an ROTC unit, or Officer





Candidate School, receive much more comprehensive instruction in command responsibility, personnel management, and human relations.<sup>2</sup>

When the Doolittle Report was released to the public, some viewed it as opening Pandora's box and others did not think it proved anything in particular. The conflicting views are illustrated by quotations from newspapers commenting on the report at the time of release:

New York Times - The report of the Doolittle Board on its investigations of Army personal relationships should appeal to all ranks as a sensible evaluation of the basic frictions that exist in the military service.

Springfield Union - On the whole, we would say that the Doolittle Board found little fundamentally wrong with the Army - certainly not enough to have warranted all the furore caused by the much-publicized criticism of a caste system which the present report admits is non-existent.

Boston Globe - The whole tenor of the report is practical and affirmative.

Washington Post - Reforms recommended by the Doolittle Board constitute a program of basic justice which can only result in a better satisfied and hence more efficient Army.<sup>3</sup>

The study was received with mixed emotions by the regular officers of the Army. The following comments were made by Major General Manton S. Eddy, Commanding General of the Third Service Command, in a speech at Richmond, Virginia: "The distinction based upon rank is not undemocratic, and we'd better think carefully before we destroy a good thing."<sup>4</sup> Paradoxically, shortly before the Doolittle Report was released, a severe clamp down in discipline was put into effect upon the occupation troops in Europe in response to disciplinary problems caused by general laxness

<sup>2</sup>"Board Asks More Pay, Liberal Retirements," Army-Navy Journal, June 1, 1946, p. 1188.

<sup>3</sup>"U.S. Daily Press Views-The Doolittle Report," Army-Navy Journal, June 8, 1946, p. 1190.

<sup>4</sup>"Caste System Study," Army-Navy Journal, April 13, 1946, p. 976.



in troop discipline. The reaction of the press throughout the country was typical of the differences of opinion both in and out of military circles of how the military should be disciplined.

Omaha World Herald - Soldiers who behave badly are not likely to respond to reasons and pleas that they are representatives of the United States and should conduct themselves accordingly. They will improve only if they know the penalty for bad conduct will be swift and sure.

St-Louis Post-Dispatch - More discipline probably is needed. It is doubtful, however, if the Army's traditional idea of discipline will suffice here. More difficult, but in the long run more effective measures would include a program of education which goes beyond what is being done now.<sup>5</sup>

Although the Doolittle Report is usually credited with contributing the major impetus toward modernizing military law, the Navy was also attempting to find out where improvement and change were needed. In the Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of the Navy in 1946 was the following statement:

Preparatory to embarking upon a comprehensive revision of naval law and regulations, the Judge Advocate General instituted a series of studies and surveys as the basis of special projects presently underway to accomplish revision and modernization of such basic sources of naval law as the Articles for the Government of the Navy, Naval Courts and Boards, and Navy Regulations.<sup>6</sup>

The studies and surveys mentioned in the above statement received little notice, either in the newspapers or throughout the services. Many of the recommendations growing out of these studies were put into effect by administrative action of the Navy Department. The studies included the following reports:

1. First Ballantine Report - 1943
2. McGuire Report - 1945

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<sup>5</sup>"Public Opinion," Army-Navy Journal, May 4, 1946, p. 1015.

<sup>6</sup>Ira F. Reese, LCDR, USN, "Surveying Naval Justice, Part I", JAG Journal, March 1950, p. 3.



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3. Second Ballantine Report - 1946
4. White Report - 1946
5. Keefe Report - 1947<sup>7</sup>

The major conclusions and recommendations of each of these reports are briefly summarized below:

First Ballantine Report

1. No major changes to Articles for the Government of the Navy (AGN) were recommended.
2. The suggested changes were designed primarily to minimize delay and loss of man hours to the service, while continuing all reasonable safeguards for the rights of the accused and avoiding any possible impairment of naval discipline.<sup>8</sup>

McGuire Report

1. Present system of naval justice outmoded, based upon traditions and a legal system designed for the Civil War era.
2. Admitted that the Navy by virtue of its primary functions cannot adopt our civilian system of justice.
3. The Navy system failed to accept and safeguard certain basic rights vital to our American viewpoint.<sup>9</sup>

Second Ballantine Report

1. Disciplinary system in general has functioned well, but war time experiences indicate need for a change.
2. Articles for the Government of the Navy constitute such an important basis of naval usage and tradition that it would be unwise to revise them

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 5.





completely. However, considerable revision is necessary to simplify and modernize the AGN.

3. Retain present schedule Captain's Mast punishment.

4. The general belief among officers of the Navy is that fitting conduct of naval personnel depends on example and encouragement rather than on infliction of penalties. This belief is in large measure responsible for the maintenance of naval discipline at a high level.<sup>10</sup>

White Report (Conducted by a single man-Commodore Robert J. White, Chaplain Corps, USNR. During late 1945 and early 1946, Chaplain White visited all of the naval places of confinement and personally interviewed 500 prisoners.)

1. Eighty-two per cent of men interviewed said that they had received a fair trial. Concluded Naval justice functioned fairly in an overwhelming proportion of cases.

2. Recommended a complete revision of Articles for the Government of the Navy (AGN).

3. Incorporate in Articles for the Government of the Navy all the fundamental rights and privileges to which accused is now entitled, either explicitly or by implication.<sup>11</sup>

#### Keefe Report

1. Very complete and exhaustive report. Did not come up with any new ideas that were not basically covered by the other reports.

2. Strongly criticized the so called command control of court-martial system, and pointed to the need for impartial judicial review.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Reese, "Surveying Naval Justice-Part II," JAG Journal, April 1950, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid, p. 4.



As mentioned earlier these studies were given little or no publicity and few officers in the Navy were aware of the efforts being made to determine and correct the inadequacies of the Articles for the Government of the Navy. The storm of public criticism stirred up by the Doolittle Report continued during the middle and late forties. Many articles published in magazines and newspapers took the Navy as well as the Army to task for the outmoded systems of military discipline. Many of the regular officers of the Navy felt that the criticism was largely unfair and unwarranted, and the problem was aggravated mostly by war time sailors returning to civilian life and "letting off steam" about their military experiences. During this period of transition, the military periodicals were filled with articles by Navy personnel in an attempt to fight back against what they considered unjust criticism. Lieutenant (junior grade) Robert J. Lauer, USN made the following points in his article of September 1948:

1. The military is not as tyrannical as most people believe.
2. Military people are at a disadvantage. They cannot use magazines and newspapers to publicly rebutt these criticisms.
3. The rights of men must be sacrificed without question if the exigencies of the service demand it.
4. Democracy cannot function in the military sphere.
5. Men must depend upon the integrity of the officers in command.
6. There were too many part time officers in World War II.<sup>13</sup>

Boatswainmate First Class Edmund A. Gibson, USN, a veteran of 15 years at sea made the following comments in an article in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings:

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<sup>13</sup>Robert J. Lauer, "In Defense of the Military," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September, 1948, p. 1136.







It is my honest opinion that men in the Regular Services, professional soldiers and sailors, do not ordinarily complain about the "Caste System" for the simple reason that they are not aware of the fact that there is one. Speaking for Navy men, I am certain they are entirely without any feeling of inferiority, social or otherwise to their officers.<sup>14</sup>

Mr. Gibson went on to say that he had had several opportunities to witness a few of the so-called "democratic officers" in action. The "call me Nick ashore boys" type of officer elicited only distrust and disgust from the men. He said that enlisted men enjoyed their own separate places of entertainment and resented it when officers came to these places. Mr. Gibson concluded his article by asking the news media to "mind their own business" and let the Navy handle its own affairs.<sup>15</sup>

However, as the forties wore on, both the Army in response to the pressures created by the Doolittle Report, and the Navy responding to its own studies were working toward modernizing their own brand of military law. Concurrent with the pressure to update military law and discipline, was the push toward unification of the armed services. Shortly after the convening of the 80th Congress in 1946, the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives commenced hearings on military justice. The proposed Army Bill was passed by the House of Representatives and reached the Senate Armed Services Committee. At the time the Army Bill reached the committee, the committee was considering a proposed Navy bill to amend the Articles for the Government of the Navy. Senator Chan Gurney of South Dakota realized that the enactment of two separate bills would not be a step toward unification. In a letter to the Secretary of Defense in May 1948, Senator

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<sup>14</sup>Edmund A. Gibson, "More About the Caste System," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, September, 1949, p. 1005.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, p. 1009.



Gurney suggested a uniform code of military justice be prepared.<sup>16</sup> The Secretary of Defense, Mr. James T. Forrestal, arranged for the formation of a "Committee on a Uniform Code of Military Justice" and on August 18, 1948 forwarded a precept reading in part as follows:

The task of the Committee is to draft, in time for submission to the 81st Congress, a uniform code of military justice applicable to the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The Code should be drafted so as to be uniform in substance and uniform in application and interpretation. It should protect the rights of those subject to the Code, with the view of increasing public confidence in military justice, and without impairing the performance of military functions.

In drafting the new Code the Committee shall consult with such persons in the Armed Forces as it may wish and invite the views of such individuals and organizations from outside the National Military Establishment as it may desire.<sup>17</sup>

The Committee consisted of the following members:

Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Harvard Law School - Chairman

Mr. W. John Kenney - Under Secretary of the Navy

Mr. Gordon Gray - Assistant Secretary of the Army

Mr. Eugene Zuckert - Assistant Secretary of the Air Force

Representatives of all services<sup>18</sup>

This committee went into conference during the Summer of 1948 and submitted the proposed UCMJ to Congress in February 1949.<sup>19</sup> On 5 May 1950 President Truman affixed his signature to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the armed services had a new code of law. The bill provided for the new

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<sup>16</sup>H. J. Webb, CDR, USCG, "Uniform Code of Military Justice," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, July, 1950, p. 723.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid, p. 725.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, p. 729.





code to become effective 31 May 1951, providing twelve months during which the services could prepare manuals of court martial procedure under the new law and indoctrinate their personnel in the changes brought about. The Navy had the greater number of changed procedures, because the Uniform Code of Military Justice adopted the framework of the army court martial system, together with its legal terminology.

It became evident upon reading the new code that the authority of the commanding officer had been severely restricted in contrast to the Articles for the Government of the Navy. Commander Henry J. Cappello, USN, said:

In spite of the many changes wrought by the UCMJ and the ill advised endeavors of some people unfamiliar with the necessities of military organizations and discipline to abrogate entirely the Commanding Officer's authority to impose punishment, "Mast" remains the Navy's Commanding Officer's most important tool for the enforcement of discipline and enhancement of morale.<sup>20</sup>

Commander Cappello's opinion of the inadequacy of the authority of the commanding officer under the new law was shared by most line officers. As the new code began to be tested by time and use, the Army and Air Force came to the same conclusion. The Uniform Code of Military Justice had curtailed the authority of the commanding officer to an extent which was hindering the commanding officer in carrying out his responsibilities. In the 1955 Annual Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals and Judge Advocate Generals of the Armed Forces and the General Counsel of the Treasury representing the Coast Guard, it was agreed that the power of the commanding officer should be increased.<sup>21</sup> During the Summer of 1955, a proposal to amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice was forwarded to

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<sup>20</sup>Henry J. Cappello, "Captain's Mast," JAG Journal, October 1955, p. 6.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.





Congress by the Department of Defense. Some of the more significant changes recommended were:

A commanding officer exercising general court-martial authority could impose on an officer or warrant officer of his command forfeiture of one half of his pay per month for a period not to exceed three months, instead of the presently authorized one month.

A commanding officer could confine an enlisted man of his command for a period not to exceed seven consecutive days, and there would be no requirement that the enlisted man be aboard ship.

A commanding officer would also have the power to impose on an enlisted man of his command forfeiture of one-half of one month's pay for a period not to exceed three months.<sup>22</sup>

Eight years later, Executive Order No. 11081 of 29 January 1963 amended Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice as follows:

A commanding officer exercising general court-martial authority could impose on an officer or warrant officer of his command forfeiture of one half of his pay per month for a period not to exceed two months. (Three months had been requested.)

A commanding officer, if imposed upon a person attached to a ship, could order confinement on bread and water or diminished rations for not more than three days. If imposed by a Lieutenant Commander or above, a commanding officer could impose correctional custody for not more than 30 days. (Congress refused to give commanding officers not aboard ship the authority to confine enlisted men on bread and water and restricted the commanding officer of a ship to issue a bread and water punishment for

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<sup>22</sup>"JAG Bulletin Board", JAG Journal, July, 1955, p. 2.



only three days. In place of the concept of confinement, a concept of correctional custody was substituted and a maximum punishment of 30 days was authorized.)

A commanding officer could impose upon an enlisted man in his command forfeiture of not more than one-half of one month's pay per month for two months. (Three months had been requested).<sup>23</sup>

Although it took almost eight years for Congress to reverse some of the original concepts of the UCMJ, in general the authority of the commanding officer was increased as requested.

It has developed in this chapter that the Navy, due primarily to the tremendous influx of civilians into the armed services during World War II, slowly realized the need for updating and amending the Articles for the Government of the Navy. Within the Navy, studies were conducted to determine the proper direction to head in modernizing Naval law. Many improvement which did not require Congressional action were made in the AGN through internal administrative action by the Navy Department. However, as a result of the Navy studies, amendments to the Articles for the Government of the Navy were submitted to Congress. Unification pressures during the same time frame aborted the Navy's attempts to revise and modernize the AGN and the idea of a uniform code of military justice was born. New concepts in military law as expressed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice were not the only answers to the evolving new philosophy of authority and discipline. The next chapter will attempt to discuss some of the other means that were developed by the Navy to adjust to the new social philosophy that was emerging within the Navy.

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<sup>23</sup>Addendum to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 1951,  
January. 1963. p. 42.





CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW  
PHILOSOPHY

## IN THE

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## CHAPTER IV

### IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHY

The new Uniform Code of Military Justice gave the Navy the formal expression of the new social philosophy which was changing the basis of authority and discipline in the Navy. However, other factors were germane to the evolution of a basis of authority founded on authoritarianism to a new philosophy more democratic in nature. This change had been gradual in nature and many means were used to assimilate this shift in emphasis. "As the excessively harsh discipline declined, athletics have taken over, since a sport involves a team spirit, and is appropriate preparation for military life."<sup>1</sup> The big shift in emphasis toward athletics began at the turn of the century, as the team concept began to grow in importance. The first football game between the Naval Academy and the Military Academy was played 29 November 1890. Score Navy-24, Army-0.<sup>2</sup> The importance of athletics gradually spread throughout the service, and soon penetrated the enlisted ranks. It has progressed to a point today where at the service academies and major commands, it approaches semi-professionalism. The Naval Academy football team in 1963 was rated the number two team in the nation by the Associated and United Press polls. Navy's quarterback that year, Roger Staubach, was awarded the Heisman Trophy, an award given annually to the nation's outstanding football player. The tremendous emphasis

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<sup>1</sup>Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 131.

<sup>2</sup>Almanac of Navy Facts, (Menasha: Wisconsin: George Banta Co., Inc, 1964), p. 188.





on athletics reaches down to the smallest ships in commission, and the success and reputation of the ship's athletic teams has a measureable effect on the crew's morale and overall efficiency of the unit. The importance of athletics is stressed at every level in the Navy's chain of command and has done much to develop a team spirit concept. It is well known throughout the Navy that many of the leaders at all levels were outstanding athletes at the Naval Academy or at civilian colleges. A significant number of Flag Officers in the Navy today were outstanding athletes at the Naval Academy.

The United States Naval Academy, which more than any other institution reflects the leadership philosophy of the Navy, has slowly withdrawn from a concept of mechanistic authority to one which emphasizes persuasion and manipulative skills. The lessons learned from World War II made it obvious that the curriculum at the Naval Academy would have to be altered to provide training in interpersonal skills. The author can remember his own experiences at the Naval Academy during the end of the war and after. It was a period of severe conflict between the traditionalists and the more enlightened naval officers. The environment of the school reflected this discord. The author recalls an incident during which a minor infraction of the rules resulted in 1200 plebes (freshmen) having to stand at attention for three hours until the individual who committed the offense confessed to the duty officer. Hazing and physical punishment were still the *modus operandi* by which the new plebes were assimilated into the military environment. One of the first experiences each new plebe underwent was the "haircut," the hair being cut until it was one-half inch in length.

The next four years saw a gradual inching away from the traditional authoritarian concept of authority and discipline. During the author's





second year at the Naval Academy, a new superintendent arrived who began to make changes. The physical punishment and hazing were declared against regulations. Midshipmen were granted more time off to mix with the civilian populace, and this did much to civilianize the institution. Leadership courses were emphasized utilizing the case method. Paradoxically, the author can remember taking an enlightened course in leadership which was taught by an officer who was a martinet of the old school in every sense of the word. The instructor suffered as much, if not more, than his neophyte students. This situation was typical of the conflict between the old and the new which was raging. However, progress was being made and "since 1955, applied courses in human relations and group psychology have been offered at all three service academies, and stand as a testament to the fact that the requirements of the organizational revolution have penetrated the military profession".<sup>3</sup> Today a midshipman in his junior year at the Naval Academy is required to take course number "C 306," "Introduction to Military Psychology and Management".<sup>4</sup> This is a 2.5 semester hour course which is described as "Introduction to the study of psychological measurement, personality and social influences in behavior".<sup>5</sup> In addition course number C 805 "Military Psychology"<sup>6</sup> is offered as an elective. This course is described as "A study of those aspects of social psychology applicable to the military including basic psychological factors, social attitudes, the social

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<sup>3</sup>Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 133.

<sup>4</sup>United States Naval Academy Catalogue of Information, 1964-1965, Annapolis, Maryland, p. 11.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, p. 57.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid, p. 59.





and cultural habitat, military organizations as social systems, leadership groups, and individual role behavior and personality in military groups."<sup>7</sup>

Since World War II the Navy has recruited and trained the majority of its officers through the medium of the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corp program. In fact, the services are looking more each year to civilian educational institutions as a primary source of active duty and career officers.<sup>8</sup> The NROTC or HOLLOWAY Program for officers offers a four year education at one of 52 universities throughout the country. In 1959 a course in basic psychology was included in the Holloway Program curriculum. This was done in consonance with the Navy's new leadership concept that a better understanding of human motivation will lead to better leadership and higher morale.<sup>9</sup>

World War II also witnessed the beginning of the use of psychologists by the Navy. During World War II, psychologists were primarily used for personnel selection. Since the war, the use of psychologists has become much more systematic and broader in scope. In 1957, 5% of the members of the Association of American Psychologists were at work on military problems.<sup>10</sup> In 1946 the Navy established what is now the Psychological Sciences Division of the Office of Naval Research.<sup>11</sup> Under the auspices of this division contracts are drawn up between the Navy and civilian institutions. In 1956 the

<sup>7</sup>Ibid, p. 58.

<sup>8</sup>Gene M. Lyons and John W. Masland, Education and Military Leadership (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959) p. xi.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid, p. 184.

<sup>10</sup>Arthur W. Melton, "Military Psychology in the USA," American Psychologist, December, 1957, p. 742.

<sup>11</sup>John G. Darby, "Psychology and the Office of Naval Research - A Decade of Development," American Psychologist, June, 1957, p. 305.





Psychological Science Division of The Office of Naval Research (ONR) was supporting 143 separate contracts for research and development in the various fields of psychology. The cost of these contracts to the Navy was \$2,000,000 annually.<sup>12</sup> Representative of these contracts is "A Study of Leadership Among Submarine Officers" by Donald T. Campbell of Ohio State University. This study is concerned with "the problem of the criteria in leadership studies and the relation of these criteria to a number of variables which describe what the leaders do and how they do it."<sup>13</sup> The use of psychologists by the Navy is well established and by the virtue of good relations within the Navy organization and good outcome of contract programs, the confidence level of psychologists is high within the Office of Naval Research. In the community of scientists throughout the country, the confidence level in ONR is also high.

In 1950 Admiral Arleigh Burke became concerned over the vast numbers of technically competent men leaving the Navy. He personally conducted an exhaustive study to find out why. Most of the 10,000 separatees questioned indicated they were leaving out of "sheer disgust". They felt their jobs were unimportant and got no satisfaction from doing them. Nearly 7,000 men were convinced that both their immediate and superior officers were entirely uninterested in them as human beings with individual inspirations and problems.<sup>14</sup> This was the beginning of a program which culminated on May 17, 1958 with the unexpected issue of General

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Donald T. Campbell, "A Study Of Leadership Among Submarine Officers" (Columbus: The Ohio State University Research Foundation, 1953)

<sup>14</sup>John G. Hubbell, "Moral Build-Up Gives New Strength to the Navy", The Navy Blue Book, ed. Tom Compere (New York; Bobbs Merrill Co., 1960), p. 131.





Order 21 on Armed Forces Day to every commanding officer in the Naval Establishment by Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of the Navy. See Appendix for complete text of General Order 21. The order defined leadership as:

The art of accomplishing the Navy's mission through people. It is the sum of those qualities of intellect, of human understanding and moral character that enable a man to inspire and to manage a group of people successfully. Effective leadership, therefore, is based on personal example, good management practices, and moral responsibility.<sup>15</sup>

The general order went on to state the objective of this order was:

To reemphasize and revitalize Naval Leadership in all its aspects: inspirational, technical, and moral. Combat readiness requires that all persons in authority observe in themselves the standards of moral behavior and devotion to duty laid down in Navy Regulations. The Navy must also develop and use new concepts of management and executive development to ensure efficiency and the best use of people.<sup>16</sup>

The general order was shortly implemented by the Chief of Naval Personnel who established leadership schools for officers and petty officers at key locations throughout the country, set up a leadership group in Washington which coordinated mobile leadership teams to aid commanding officers requesting help in setting up their programs, and sent (personally signed) letters to each prospective commanding officer emphasizing the importance of good leadership and the significance of General Order 21.<sup>17</sup> See Appendix IV for letter received by author prior to taking command of submarine CUBERA.

In 1958 the Chief of Naval Personnel established three Petty Officer Leadership Schools. These schools were located at Norfolk, San Diego, and

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<sup>15</sup>Navy Department General Order Number 21 of 17 May 1958, par. 4.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid, par. 5.

<sup>17</sup>Department of the Navy Leadership Group, Proceedings, February 1960-January 1961 (Washington, 1961), p. vi.

There is no doubt that the present state of the world is a result of the action of the forces of nature, and that the forces of nature are the only forces that are at work in the world.

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The first of the forces of nature is the force of gravity, which is the force that attracts all bodies towards each other. The second of the forces of nature is the force of cohesion, which is the force that holds the particles of matter together. The third of the forces of nature is the force of repulsion, which is the force that repels the particles of matter from each other.

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Great Lakes. This small nucleus quickly expanded until today there are 65 such schools for petty officers, officers, and in some cases mixed classes of petty officers and officers.<sup>18</sup> Courses in these schools vary in length from two days to four weeks, but in all of them the curriculum emphasizes psychology and human relations. Typical of these schools is the Leadership Academy at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia which in March this year "graduated 27 students from its Petty Officer Leadership Academy, the 43rd such class to complete the four week course since it was started in 1959."<sup>19</sup>

Shortly after the promulgation of General Order 21, the Chief of Naval Personnel established a small, permanent leadership staff in Washington, D.C., and set up the Leadership Field Teams in various areas to serve as extensions of this staff. The staff produces and distributes materials in the form of books, pamphlets, curricula, check-lists, articles, movies, and tapes, built around the use of the guided discussion as a leadership tool supplemental to the exercise of the principles and practices of good leadership.<sup>20</sup> Seven teams, each consisting of a senior officer and a chief petty officer were trained to show Naval Officers and petty officers how to implement the new leadership program. The plan was simple. Officers implementing the program were given thirty discussion guides, each designed to reach the core of a vital subject within ten to twenty minutes. The chiefs were required to arrange their division work schedules so as to fit in two of these discussions each week.

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<sup>18</sup>Department of the Navy Leadership Working Group, Proceedings February 1961-January 1964 (Washington, 1964), p. 13-6.

<sup>19</sup>"Leadership Academy Graduates 43rd Class," Navy Times, 3 March 1965, p. E-4.

<sup>20</sup>Department of the Navy Leadership Working Group, Proceedings February 1961-January 1964, p. 13-6.





The first objective of the leadership course was to train officers to help their men gain a perspective on themselves. Early sessions dealing with the dignity, importance, responsibility and rights of the individual human being would enable men to start developing a clear cut sense of self-respect and, simultaneously, respect for and faith in their shipmates. The men were to learn the real meaning of discipline - that is not necessarily synonymous with punishment, but is an invaluable tool with which men accomplish greatness and strive for perfection. As the men came to realize their own value and to feel themselves part of naval tradition, they were to be led through a fundamental understanding of the American philosophy.<sup>21</sup>

Since the inception of the idea, leadership field teams have visited 3,600 commands and have contacted over 232,000 people.<sup>22</sup> The author, while the commanding officer of a submarine during the period 1962-1964, had occasion to observe the Norfolk team in action aboard his ship. Initially some of the senior petty officers were hostile to the idea of devoting two days listening to material they felt they already were familiar with. The team used a "soft sell" and human relations approach, and the author was gratified when he heard remarks at the conclusion of the course such as, "It's the best thing that has ever happened to me in the Navy" and "Why did the Navy take so long to start this kind of program?"

How effective has this program been since its beginning almost seven years ago? Shortly a year after General Order 21 was issued, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy made the following statement, "G.O. 21 has

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<sup>21</sup>Hubbell, 132.

<sup>22</sup>Department of the Navy Leadership Working Group, Proceedings February 1961-January 1964, p. 13-6.



reduced the general court-martial rate from the 1946-1947 level of 12 per thousand men to 1.4 per thousand."<sup>23</sup> Within six months after the new leadership program was started, a West Coast aircraft squadron not only increased its aircraft availability by more than fifty per cent, it made more than half again as many of its airplanes constantly ready to fly at an instant's notice, and increased its reenlistment rate from seven to fifty-five per cent. Within a year the Recruit Training Center at Great Lakes, Illinois, halved its number of courts-martial. A major fleet air wing at Pearl Harbor became so efficient it was able to release 150 men for duty elsewhere. An air station in Florida saw its reenlistment rate shoot from 47 per cent to 63 per cent. In a six months period at Whiting Field, Florida, student pilots were able to fly 11,856 more training hours than during the same time period a year previous, before General Order 21.<sup>24</sup>

The situations mentioned above represent dramatic instances where improvement could be directly tied to General Order 21. However, the overall effect of General Order 21 was excellent, and the results were measurable to the extent that the program received command attention. Some commands, particularly the small ships, were reluctant to give up the time required to properly implement the program due to an already over-burdened schedule. However, as the program gained impetus and the results of good active programs became known, widespread acceptance and full implementation became the rule rather than the exception.

There was actually nothing new about General Order 21. It was full of ideas military leaders take for granted - the value of personal example;

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<sup>23</sup>"A Message From the JAG", JAG Journal, July-August, 1960, p. 18.

<sup>24</sup>Hubbell, pp. 129-130.





the proposition that the more powerful weapons become, the more important becomes the will and character of the men who must use them; the need for good management practices - taking care of the men, and seeing that they are content in their jobs.<sup>25</sup>

In summary it can be said that the Navy has attempted to reflect the changing basis of authority and discipline by encouraging participation in athletics to foster the concept of team effort and cooperation. The curriculum at the Naval Academy and at the many civilian institutions where Naval Officers are educated has been modified to include courses on psychology and leadership to help assimilate the new social philosophy. Since World War II the Navy has been making excellent use of psychologists through the Division of Psychological Sciences of the Office of Naval Research in order to determine what constitutes a good leader and trying to formulate programs which will turn out good leaders. Finally in 1958 the issuance of General Order 21 - which outlined the education of officers and petty officers in enlightened modern leadership techniques with the major emphasis on human relations - was an attempt to give the Navy a vehicle with which to implement the new social philosophy of authority and discipline.

It has been demonstrated that the new leadership program with strong emphasis on the dignity of man and human relations has enjoyed a degree of success since its inception seven years ago. However, the Navy is a mixture of the old and the new, and old habits and modus operandi are difficult to discard in an organization where tradition and custom play a major role. The next and concluding chapter will attempt to draw a few conclusions concerning the status of the evolution of the basis of authority and discipline,

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<sup>25</sup>Hubbell, 130.



probe into some of the dilemmas that this philosophy has created, and see what the future holds for this new evolving social and organizational philosophy.





## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS, DILEMMAS, AND TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE



## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS, DILEMMAS, AND TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE

It is safe to conclude that the basis of authority and discipline within the Navy has undergone a remarkable transformation. This shift in emphasis from domination and absolutism to a form of discipline and authority which has for its basis a more democratic philosophy, started before World War I and evolved painfully during World War II and the Korean Conflict.

Since the Navy is a reflection of civilian social structure to a large degree, this transformation reflects the changes in the larger society. Popular demand for equality of treatment has grown with industrialization. As the standard of living rises, tolerances for the discomfits of military life decreases. The skepticism of urban life carries over into the military to a greater degree than in previous generations, so that military personnel will not follow orders blindly, but will demand an explanation from those in command.<sup>1</sup> The emphasis on individual initiative, the demands of technical expertise, the automation of warfare and the coordination required by a complex group of specialists to operate our highly sophisticated war machine has doomed authoritarian discipline.

In the Navy today, there is still a lingering traditionalist element which views the trend toward a less authoritative form of discipline as

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<sup>1</sup>Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, 40.



# REPORT

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE GENERAL LAND OFFICE

IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

PASSED ON THE 12TH MARCH 1871

AND IN ANSWER TO A RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

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undermining the whole system of discipline and authority. Fortunately, there is also a growing number of enlightened officers and petty officers who have been trained and educated to realize that a return to an organizational form based on domination is impossible. The obvious solution to the dilemma is a reeducation of the traditionalist group. That such an effort is necessary can be demonstrated by quoting excerpts from a letter by a commanding officer concerning the low reenlistment rates due in part to old fashioned "chicken" management practices:

There is no reason why modern management techniques, stressing enlightened human relations, cannot be actively employed in every Naval Command. There need be no conflict with discipline or traditional smartness and ceremony. Many ships, aircraft squadrons, and a few shore establishments have been so commanded and operated, due to a particularly dynamic and skilled commanding officer. But most commands are only average and some provide any casual observer with the kind of examples of chicken you describe.

The key to modern, enlightened leadership with the major emphasis on productive human relations lies in the education of petty officers and officers. This was the intent of the Navy's leadership program of 1958, established by Secretary of the Navy Gates when he signed General Order No. 21 . . . The program started well but inevitably became swallowed up in vested interests and institutional apathy that make all innovations suspect. Since "we had never lost a war" there could not be much wrong in doing things the old way. The social and technological revolution taking place in our society was ignored as could have been predicted.<sup>2</sup>

That the long term trend has been and will continue to be toward a less authoritative form of discipline is a reality. However, the Navy exists primarily as a potential fighting force, and the combat unit necessarily represents the organizational prototype. This raises the question of how far can the Navy allow this trend away from absolutism and domination to continue and still maintain a highly efficient organization emphasizing morale and individual initiative. This search for the proper equilibrium of

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<sup>2</sup>"Letters to the Editor," Navy Times, February 13, 1965, p. 13.





authority is one of the dilemmas that is facing the Navy today. A serious lesson was learned when the authority of the commanding officer was curtailed under the Uniform Code of Military Justice to the point where the proper performance of his duties suffered. As pointed out previously, the error was discovered and only after much effort and eight years of discussion did Congress rectify the mistake. It is the author's opinion that it is this type of trial and error approach which will lead the armed services to a proper balance of authority and discipline commensurate with the larger society.

The changing social philosophy with regard to authority and discipline has been recognized and formally implemented in the Navy through the creation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the inclusion of courses dealing with psychology and human relations in the curricula at the Naval Academy and the various Naval Reserve Officers Training Corp (NROTC) colleges, and the issuance of General Order 21 with all its ramifications. These are the vehicles by which the Navy hopes to achieve this shift in emphasis. Today's times are perilous, as a nation can literally disappear from the face of the earth if its defense efforts are not sufficient to successfully prevent a nuclear exchange or neutralize the effects of an attack if one should be launched against it. Only by the universal use of enlightened and democratic management techniques will it be possible to attract the intelligent and highly motivated young officers and petty officers so urgently needed in increasing numbers to man and operate the highly complex war machines that are vital for the protection of this nation. The need has been discovered, the means have been provided, the success or failure in achieving enlightened management will in large part hinge on the emphasis placed upon this program by those in high command.





APPENDIX I

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE

DOOLITTLE REPORT



## APPENDIX I

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

of the  
DOOLITTLE REPORT

#### CONCLUSIONS

This board has arrived unanimously at the following conclusions:

1. The rapid expansion of the Army, from an establishment of 198,335 in September 1939 to 8,291,336 in May 1945, created an unprecedented personnel problem. When due consideration is given to all difficulties experienced in preparing for war in a democracy, it becomes obvious that the Army did a truly magnificent job in this second World War.

2. A comparison of the aftermath of World War II with similar periods following other wars, in which this country was involved, indicates that the present reaction against the military organization is not unique and has occurred in varying degrees despite the fact that we emerged victorious.

3. Because of the distaste of citizens in our democracy for a regimented life in which an individual to some extent loses his identity, and because the majority who served were conscripted or drafted, many against their will, much of the general criticism could be expected.

4. Americans look with disfavor upon any system which grants unearned privileges to a particular class of individuals and find distasteful any tendency to make arbitrary social distinctions between two parts of the Army.

5. There were irregularities, injustices in handling of enlisted personnel, and abuses of privileges in the recent war to such an extent as to cause wide-spread and deep-seated criticisms.

6. The causes of poor relationships between commissioned and enlisted personnel are traceable, in general, to two main factors:

a. Undeniably poor leadership on the part of a small percentage of those in positions of responsibility;

b. A system that permits and encourages a wide official and social gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel.

7. In most instances poor leadership resulted from the thrusting into positions of authority men who were inherently unqualified or were inadequately trained as leaders. This was brought about by the rapid expansion of the officer corps called for by the national emergency. There were errors in selection. Orientation and indoctrination were inadequate. Training was abbreviated. All of this resulted in





failure to emphasize the importance of morale, efficient personnel management, and responsibilities. In the training, the Army was limited to emphasizing technical proficiency. The exigencies of time did not allow the Army to develop fully among commissioned personnel a more liberal understanding of responsibility to their troops. In selecting officers the Army was forced to rely upon the character, background, and leadership which they demonstrated while in the process of training.

8. The peace-time Army did not adequately prepare officers for the war-time job of handling civilian soldiers; it did not offer a code of officer-enlisted man conduct flexible enough for application to an Army in which the bulk of the men in all ranks were civilian.

9. The official gap between commissioned and enlisted personnel was widened during the war by untrained and unqualified officers who carried distinctions into the social life. This was to a large extent due to faulty interpretation of the customs and traditions of the regular officer corps in a peace-time Army.

10. It is extremely difficult under existing procedures to get rid of incompetents and undesirables among the officer group.

11. There is a need for a new philosophy in the military order, a policy of treatment of men, especially in the "ranks," in terms of advanced concepts in social thinking. The present system does not permit full recognition of the dignity of man. More definite protection from the arbitrary acts of superiors is essential.

12. Under the present system enlisted personnel are dependent for the satisfaction of many of their needs upon the behavior and attitudes of their officers, but are denied a feeling of security and opportunities for development and self-realization. Despite the procedures established for this purpose, enlisted personnel and junior officers have actually not enjoyed complete freedom in presenting their grievances. One of the most lacking yet important phases of the military structure is an alert and effective internal policing service and an agency providing a practical means of redress.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board has kept constantly in mind in weighing evidence, coming to conclusions, and in preparing its recommendations, the following:

1. There must be assurance that we, as a nation, have a modern economical, efficient, and effective military establishment which can, if needed, win battles and a war.
2. Maintenance of control and discipline, which are essential to the success of any military operation.
3. Maintenance of morale which must be of the highest order and under continual scrutiny.
4. That the people returning from combat duty or service in the military establishment, return in the best possible physical, mental, moral, and spiritual condition.
5. That conditions be such as to create in the mind of the soldier a favorable impression of the military service and the government.

The following description of the structure of the government of the United States is taken from the Constitution of the United States, which is the basis of the government of the United States. The government of the United States is a federal republic, in which the powers of government are divided among three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. The executive branch is headed by the President, who is elected by the people for a four-year term. The legislative branch is composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate, which are elected by the people for two-year terms. The judicial branch is headed by the Supreme Court, which is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

The President is the head of the executive branch and is responsible for enforcing the laws of the United States. He or she has the power to appoint and remove federal judges, ambassadors, and other high-ranking officials. The President also has the power to declare war and to grant pardons. The House of Representatives is the lower house of the legislature and is composed of members elected by the people for two-year terms. The Senate is the upper house of the legislature and is composed of members elected by the states for six-year terms.

The Supreme Court is the highest court in the United States and is responsible for interpreting the Constitution and the laws of the United States. It is composed of nine justices, who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Supreme Court has the power to review the actions of the executive and legislative branches and to declare laws unconstitutional. The government of the United States is a federal republic, in which the powers of government are divided among three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.

The executive branch is headed by the President, who is elected by the people for a four-year term. The President has the power to appoint and remove federal judges, ambassadors, and other high-ranking officials. He or she also has the power to declare war and to grant pardons. The legislative branch is composed of the House of Representatives and the Senate, which are elected by the people for two-year terms. The House of Representatives is the lower house of the legislature and is composed of members elected by the people for two-year terms. The Senate is the upper house of the legislature and is composed of members elected by the states for six-year terms.

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6. Improvement of the character, the knowledge, and the competency of those who have been and those who are in the service or plan to become members of the Army.

7. Assurance of ready availability of all elements of a military establishment in case of an emergency.

8. Assurance of ready expansion of a citizens' Army in case of a national emergency.

The Board therefore strongly recommends

1. That steps be taken to improve leadership in the officer corps of the Army in order that the corps will merit the respect of soldiers and civilians alike. That this be accomplished by: (1) better selection, (2) more adequate orientation and indoctrination, (3) effective training, (4) proper assignments, (5) promotion on basis of merit, (6) employment of a rigorous method of screening and selecting out of incompetents and undesirables, (7) a more effective internal policing system to prevent abuses of privileges other than those facilities and means which enable an officer to do a job more effectively. The following specific actions be inaugurated:

a. Selection

That selection of men for positions of responsibility, up the scale, be based upon the most advanced practices in personnel selection found in industry, business, government, and those developed in the Army. Some of the criteria should be:

(1) Previous military training, preferably one year in the enlisted ranks, exceptions to be established in cases of outstanding individuals, especially technicians, who, unless they qualify, should not be placed in command positions.

(2) Character, with emphasis on interest in and potential ability to work with and manage people.

b. Orientation and indoctrination

That sufficient time be expended in order to inculcate thoroughly:

(1) A sound appreciation of responsibilities, and especially to subordinates.

(2) The intelligent use of authority.

(3) The idea that privileges which accompany rank and responsibility are established to better enable an individual to perform his duties effectively and efficiently and are not for the purpose of improving his own personal interest.

(4) An appreciation of the military service and its mission.

c. Training

That, in addition to the training in technical subjects, each candidate, whether at West Point, an ROTC unit, or Officer Candidate School, receive such more comprehensive instruction in command responsibility, personnel management, and human relations.

d. Assignment

That assignments to positions of responsibility be made on the basis of ability and training of the individual, thus enabling the Army to utilize talents where required.

e. Promotion and/or demotion

That a complete review be made of the system of promotion, and that a promotion system on a merit basis be established, making it possible to permit especially competent individuals to be advanced ahead of any seniority average; that some system of demotion be established whereby,





after a trial period, if an individual does not meet the requirements and demonstrates that he is incapable of assuming certain responsibilities and performing certain duties, he will be demoted. Lack of promotion or demotion must not be the basis for any stigmatization.

f. Dismissal

That, in addition to a merit system for promotion, there be established a system whereby greater facility in eliminating the incompetent personnel and the "undesirables" is possible, thus enabling the Army to dismiss an individual when found not suitable for a job, incompetent or unable to manifest the required leadership qualities. Such a procedure will eliminate unnecessary retention in the service, indiscriminate transfers, and other existing methods of dealing with incompetence. Demotion to a level where competence is obtained may be preferable to actual dismissal.

g. Retirement

That there be established a retirement system whereby, for shorter periods of service, 10, 20, and 30 years, individuals will have the privilege of retiring and be assured some security for having spent a part of their life in the Army; that, in addition, there be a regulation which provides for approval of requests for retirement at any time, thus making it relatively easier to retire; that this system be made applicable to enlisted personnel as well as to the commissioned. This recommendation is made in part because the Army of the future should be one of young men who, in general, are better able to cope with new and scientific concepts, that the retention of elder men should be only on the basis of proven capacity to accept new ideas (lack of open-mindedness of some senior officers in the past created difficulties), and with the thought in mind of making it easier for the Army to rid itself of incompetents.

h. Disability retirement

That an equitable system for commissioned and enlisted personnel be established.

2. That steps be taken to provide all military personnel with a sense of security, substantial compensation for duty and responsibility from bottom to top, equitable distribution of allowances, and assurance of a chance for advancement. It is recommended that the following specific actions be inaugurated:

a. Base pay

That the present system or schedule of base pay be reviewed from bottom to top and that the War Department establish a rate of pay which will take into consideration the increased rates of pay in industry and business in order that the Army may draw equitably from all levels of the civilian manpower reservoir. This will tend to insure the security and dignity of all Army personnel, eliminating many of the inequities which now exist.

b. Allowances

That allowances be furnished to all levels, from bottom to top, including all enlisted and commissioned personnel, on a sliding scale basis. The following should be considered in the establishment of a new table of allowances:

(1) Food

That food, wherever obtained by Government purchase, be distributed equitably to all grades and ranks, providing identical privileges for





augmentation if desired; that efforts be made to assure similarity in preparation and service.

(2) Quarters

That, in the peace-time if quarters are to be provided on posts, camps, stations, or bases, consideration be given to family size as well as to rating or rank of individuals; that, if quarters are not to be (or cannot be) provided on military installations, civilian costs as well as family size be considered in granting monetary allowances in lieu of quarters.

(3) Clothing and uniform

That clothing and uniforms be furnished all military personnel, whether or not commissioned. The Board, however has no objection to personal purchase, between military personnel, of clothing and uniforms in addition to that issued, provided what ever is purchased conforms in texture.

(4) Travel

That travel allowances for the enlisted man and for his dependents be apportioned without discrimination in terms of radius and made equitable for both enlisted and commissioned personnel.

3. That enlisted personnel be allowed to accumulate leave or furlough time and granted terminal leave pay on the same basis as is now provided for commissioned personnel; that the War Department support the legislation required to make this possible, thus eliminating the termination injustices including mustering out pay, which now exist.

4. That all military personnel be allowed when off duty, to pursue normal social patterns comparable to our democratic way of life.

5. That the use of discriminatory references, such as "officers and their ladies; enlisted men and their wives," be eliminated from directives and publications issued in military establishments.

6. That there be definite equality of treatment of both enlisted and commissioned personnel in the administration of military justice, making all equally liable under military law for errors and faults; that the higher the rank the more severe be the punishment; that there be a review of all cases where wartime operations necessitated very strict handling in order that there be due reconsideration and clemency bestowed where warranted; that enlisted personnel be permitted on courts, but that every member of a court be senior to the accused.

7. That the hand salute be abandoned off Army installations and off duty, except in occupied territories and under conditions when the procedure might be deemed necessary to properly convey military dignity to local populations, but be employed in all official greetings in the line of duty and continue to be manifest at ceremonial occasions and when the national anthem is played or the colors pass by.

8. That steps be taken to establish a system of decorations and awards which will provide for a more equitable distribution on the basis of merit and prohibit distribution to a degree that will tend to cheapen them; that it be made more difficult to obtain an award; the higher an individual goes in the scale from the bottom of the enlisted to the top of the commissioned ranks.

9. That the system for registering complaints be improved and that inspections be for the purpose of prevention as well as investigation. This will call for augmentation and possibly reorganization of the Inspector General's Section. The following is necessary:





a. Staff of inspectors general must be composed of carefully selected, highly competent individuals, whose experience particularly qualifies them for such assignment;

b. Staff of inspectors general must be increased to the extent necessary to permit it to function properly;

c. Continued study must be made of abuses with the objective of eliminating the causes.

d. Copies of reports of inspectors general must be transmitted to the War Department outside regular command channels, in addition to normal procedures, in order to eliminate political aspects of control and to insure remedial action.

10. That all regulations and instructions be so written that they not only stipulate the limited "privileges" which are essential to the performance of duties in positions of responsibility but also will be regulatory in that they will prohibit or minimize possible abuses of authority and the prestige that goes with higher rank and responsibility.

11. That abolishment of all statutes, regulations, customs, and traditions which discourage or forbid social association of soldiers of similar likes and tastes, because of military rank.

12. That necessary steps be taken to eliminate the terms and concepts, "enlisted men" and "officer," that suitable substitutes be employed (e.g., members of non-commissioned corps, members of commissioned corps, etc.) and that all military personnel be referred to as "soldiers".

13. That close contact and association with civilians be encouraged and maintained since a citizens' Army is a result of combined interest, effort, and contribution of both military and public. A mutual exchange of information will enhance the military organization. Length of military service seems to automatically divorce military personnel from civilian outlook. A maximum of military personnel living in civilian communities rather than on Army posts, will assist in accomplishing this.

14. That further study be made of accumulated materials on the subject under consideration by the Board for the purpose of extracting additional ideas which may be worthy of acceptance.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>"Board Asks More Pay, Liberal Retirements," Army and Navy Journal, June 1, 1946, p. 1188.



APPENDIX II

GENERAL ORDER 21

of

17 MAY 1958





## NAVAL LEADERSHIP

### Part I—Discussion

1. The Naval profession is an honorable one, which has traditionally commanded the respect and affection of our country. Together with our sister services we serve and protect free men everywhere. To maintain the support and respect of society, as well as to meet the requirements of his own conscience, every Naval leader must be in himself an example of our military ideals.

2. The United States Navy has long been distinguished for the high quality of its officers and men. We must never let this quality diminish. Our time of troubles and opportunity is to develop and improve our Naval leadership. The more powerful the weapons that science gives us, the more important the character and will of the men behind them. As these develop, so does the strength of the Navy, the Nation, and the Free World.

3. *The U. S. Fighting Man's Code* has well expressed the essence of our problems:

"War has been defined as a 'contest of wills.' A trained hand holds the weapon. But the will, the character, the spirit of the individual—these control the hand. More than ever, in the war for the minds of men, moral character, will, spirit are important."

4. By Naval leadership is meant the art of accomplishing the Navy's mission through people. It is the sum of those qualities of intellect, of human understanding and of moral character that enable a man to inspire and to manage a group of people successfully. Effective leadership, therefore, is based on personal example, good management practices, and moral responsibility. The term leadership as used in this order shall include all three of these elements.

5. The objective of this general order is to reemphasize and revitalize Naval leadership in all its aspects: inspirational, technical, and moral. Combat readiness requires that all persons in authority observe in themselves the standards of moral behavior and devotion to duty laid down in Navy Regulations. The Navy must also develop and use new concepts of management and executive development to ensure efficiency and the best



## General Order No. 21

use of people. The key to successful Naval leadership is personal attention and supervision based on moral responsibility.

## Part II—Organization

1. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Industrial Relations shall, under the Secretary of the Navy, be directly responsible for maintaining leadership standards and conducting leadership training of Naval, Marine Corps, and civilian personnel, respectively. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (P&RF) shall coordinate the three programs to provide a useful interchange of ideas and materials.

## Part III—Action

1. Every command in the Operating Forces and the Shore Establishment, as well as every major office or bureau of the Navy Department shall review, on a continuing basis, its standards of personal leadership to ensure that those in responsible positions are discharging their duties in accordance with Article 0702A and 1210 of *Navy Regulations*, 1948. This will include command attention to:

- a. The personal example of behavior and performance set by officers.
- b. The moral atmosphere of the command.
- c. The current standards of personal supervision of men, both in regard to management effectiveness and the development of moral responsibility.

2. To achieve the objectives outlined above, every command in the Operating Forces and the Shore Establishment shall integrate into their training programs, on a continuing basis, both the technical and moral principles and practices of leadership.

3. The Naval Inspector General shall regularly report to the appropriate commanders evidence of leadership that is both markedly superior to accepted Naval standards or decidedly inferior. Commanders receiving such favorable reports shall make appropriate notations on the record of the officer or officers responsible. In the event that unfavorable reports are received from the Naval Inspector, corrective action shall be initiated and completed.





## General Order No. 21

4. The Chief of Naval Personnel, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Industrial Relations shall issue directives to carry out the intent and to achieve the objectives of this general order. These directives shall be specific and forceful to ensure that leadership standards and training are a matter of continuing concern and importance to every person in authority in the Naval Establishment.

Thomas S. Gates  
*Secretary of the Navy*



APPENDIX III

GENERAL ORDER 21

of

1 MAY 1963





# GENERAL ORDER

NO. 21 -

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Washington, D.C., 1 May 1963

## LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

### PART I—DISCUSSION

The United States Navy-Marine Corps records of victorious achievements on land, at sea, and in the air in peace and war have won for these services an honored position in our great nation. This heritage was passed on to us by our leaders, both officer and enlisted, whose outstanding examples of courage, integrity and devotion to duty are historically significant. They accomplished their missions successfully by high caliber leadership and personal example. The strength of our nation and of our services depends upon courageous, highly motivated and responsible individuals.

### PART II—OBJECTIVE

The objective of this general order is to achieve an ever-improving state of combat readiness by:

- a. Emphasizing that successful leadership at all levels is based on personal example and moral responsibility.
- b. Insuring that every man and woman are themselves examples of military ideals.
- c. Requiring personal attention to and supervision of subordinates.

### PART III—ACTION

1. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall be directly responsible for maintaining optimum leadership standards. The Under Secretary of the Navy shall be responsible for the proper implementation of this order.
2. Fleet, Force, Type and Administrative commanders shall review each command's leadership posture as an integral part of military inspections and shall include their evaluation in inspection reports.
3. Every command and every major office and bureau of the Navy Department shall, on a continuing basis, review its leadership standards; each shall take effective measures to improve them and shall develop an awareness of the need for good leadership by providing programs for instruction in leadership principles and practices.
4. All persons in responsible positions, military and civilian, shall require that their subordinates discharge their duties in accordance with traditional concepts of Navy and Marine Corps standards, paying particular attention to:
  - a. Moral responsibility.  
(Article 0702A, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 5390, Marine Corps Manual.)
  - b. Personal example of behavior and performance.  
(Article 1210, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 5390, Marine Corps Manual.)
  - c. Established standards for personnel development.  
(Article 0710, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 1500, Marine Corps Manual.)
  - d. Integration of principles and practices of leadership into everyday routine.  
(Article 0709, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 5390, Marine Corps Manual.)
  - e. Effective organization and administration.  
(Article 0704, Navy Regulations—Paragraph 3000, Marine Corps Manual.)

For emphasis and ready reference these articles are reprinted with this General Order.

FRED KORTH

*Secretary of the Navy*



## EXTRACTS FROM UNITED STATES NAVY REGULATIONS 1948

## 0702A. Commanders' Duties of Example and Correction.

All commanding officers and others in authority in the naval service are required to show in themselves a good example of virtue, honor, patriotism, and subordination; to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons who are placed under their command; to guard against and suppress all dissolute and immoral practices, and to correct according to the laws and regulations of the Navy, all persons who are guilty of them; and to take all necessary and proper measures, under the laws, regulations, and customs of the naval service, to promote and safeguard the morale, the physical well-being, and the general welfare of the officers and enlisted persons under their command or charge.

## 1210. Conduct of Persons in the Naval Service.

All persons in the naval service shall show in themselves a good example of subordination, courage, zeal, sobriety, neatness, and attention to duty. They shall aid to the utmost of their ability, and to the extent of their authority, in maintaining good order and discipline, and in all that concerns the efficiency of the command.

## 0710. Training and Education.

The commanding officer shall:

1. Endeavor to increase the specialized and general professional knowledge of the personnel under his command by the frequent conduct of drills, classes, and instruction, and by the utilization of appropriate fleet and service schools.

2. Encourage and provide assistance and facilities to the personnel under his command who seek to further their education in professional or other subjects.

3. Require those lieutenants (junior grade) and first lieutenants who have less than two years commissioned or warrant service, and all ensigns and second lieutenants:

(a) To comply with the provisions prescribed for their instruction by the Chief of

Naval Personnel, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, or the chiefs of other appropriate bureaus.

(b) To keep journals, to attend classes, and to receive appropriate practical instruction, as the commanding officer deems advisable.

4. Detail the officers referred to in paragraph 3 of this article to as many duties successively as practicable. This rotation of duties should be completed during the first two years of the officer's commissioned service. The commanding officer shall indicate on the fitness report of each such officer the duties to which he has been assigned, the total period of assignment, and the degree of qualification in such duties.

5. Designate a senior officer or officers to act as advisers to the officers referred to in paragraph 3 of this article. These senior officers shall assist such junior officers to a proper understanding of their responsibilities and duties, and shall endeavor to cultivate in them officer-like qualities, a sense of loyalty and honor, and an appreciation of naval customs and professional ethics.

## 0709. Welfare of Personnel.

The commanding officer shall:

1. Use all proper means to promote the morale, and to preserve the moral and spiritual well-being of the personnel under his command.

2. Endeavor to maintain a satisfactory state of health and physical fitness in the personnel under his command.

3. Afford an opportunity, with reasonable restrictions as to time and place, for the personnel under his command to make requests, reports, or statements to him, and shall insure that they understand the procedures for making such requests, reports, or statements.

4. Insure that noteworthy performance of duty of personnel under his command receive timely and appropriate recognition and that suitable notations are entered in the official records of the individuals.

5. Insure that timely advancement in rating of enlisted personnel is effected in accordance with existing instructions.





## 0701. Effectiveness for Service.

The commanding officer shall:

1. Exert every effort to maintain his command in a state of maximum effectiveness for war service consistent with the degree of readiness prescribed by proper authority.
2. Report to his appropriate senior any deficiency which appreciably lessens the effectiveness of the command.
3. Report, with his recommendations, to the bureau or office concerned, whenever, in his opinion, his authorized allowances of personnel or material exceed or fall short of requirements.



APPENDIX IV

CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

LEADERSHIP LETTER

To

PERSPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICER







DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

20 APR 1962

Dear Lieutenant Commander Boykin:

Orders assigning you to duty as commanding officer of USS CUBERA (SS-347) have been issued. My purpose in writing this letter is to congratulate you on your selection for this important task; and to carry out one of the duties assigned to me by the Secretary of the Navy. It is my responsibility to ensure that leadership standards and training become a matter of continuing concern and importance to you as a commanding officer.

You, of course, realize that records of officers are carefully screened and rescreened before any officer is ordered to a command. This process rightly demands much time from many senior officers because it is so important. I know that you are aware that the authority of a commanding officer is supreme and with it go many absolute responsibilities.

Authority and responsibility are vested in the Captain as a leader; and only he can promote and establish leadership at all levels within his command.

Leadership is not new in the Navy - it has made our Navy great - we had it before Communism - and we will need it long after Communism is dead - it is not a thing of the moment but must be kept active at all levels. Since the duration of command must necessarily be short for each of us, in order to give all deserving officers an opportunity to exercise it, many commanding officers do not realize the full benefits of good leadership until late in their tours. Most of them work very hard at practicing the principles and traits of a good leader; but some are unaware that their officers and petty officers are not exerting similar efforts.

I hope that you will find your new command is leadership conscious and that a viable program is already underway. In any case, your interest and participation will be vital to a successful program.

You already know of the many useful Leadership tools available to commanding officers upon request: Type Commanders Leadership Schools, BuPers Schools, BuPers Leadership Field Teams, pamphlets, movies, and tape recordings. Your new Type Commander or an appropriate official in your commissioning command will probably give you a detailed leadership briefing during your orientation period.



Were I to be lucky enough to again be commanding officer of a ship, there are certain things that would be high on my action list. I would acquaint myself with those Articles of Navy Regulations that particularly apply to the Commanding Officer, - 0701, 0702A, 0709, 0710, 1207, and 1210 are particularly important. Next in line would be to evaluate what could be done during my tour to develop the three areas of leadership, inspiration by example - moral responsibility - and management effectiveness - as outlined in General Order No. 21. A handy little pamphlet, "The Armed Forces Officer," NavPers 15923A would be my leisure time reading material to refresh my philosophy, ideals, and principles.

Thus armed, I should be able to determine which of the many aids available would be most useful to me in revitalizing, reemphasizing and improving the leadership within my command. I could then support my thoughts through actions.

Other persons' evaluations of you as a leader were important in selecting you for command responsibility - I wish you great success in fulfilling their beliefs.

Very sincerely,

W. R. SMEDBERG, III

Lieutenant Commander Rhodes BOYKIN, Jr., U.S.N.  
Staff  
Commander Submarine Force  
U. S. Atlantic Fleet  
Norfolk 11, Virginia





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